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Abstract 
Studies have demonstrated that gambling stimuli can trigger attentional biases to 
pathological gamblers. However, with the continuous increase of exposure to gambling 
stimuli it is important to investigate the effect of gambling stimuli on the general 
population. The present research investigated whether gambling stimuli can lead to 
intrusive cognitions that could affect time perception, gambling decisions and could 
elicit craving to gamble. In study 1, using a gambling Stroop test as a prime, we showed 
that intrusive cognitions can affect gambling decisions and elicit desire to gamble. In 
study 2, using a time bisection task without any primes we did not find any such effects. 
In study 3, individuals had to perform the time bisection task twice with a priming task 
between attempts. Findings suggest that there were no intrusive cognitions as a result of 
a gambling related prime. There was however an overall effect of priming on time 
perception suggesting that mind-set could affect time perception. Future research paths 
are also suggested.  
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Pathological gambling (PG) has been well documented to share similar traits 
with substance addictions. It is accompanied by persistent and uncontrolled 
participation in gambling activities that can induce harmful psychosocial consequences 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Furthermore, a number of studies have 
presented evidence that suggest that pathological gamblers also share similar symptoms, 
like craving and urges while abstinent, with substance addicts (e.g Hodgins and el-
Guebaly, 2004; Young and Wohl, 2009).  
Research in gambling has increased in volume the last years. A number of 
studies has focused on PG and attentional bias ( e.g McCusker and Gettings, 1997; 
Diskin and Hodgins, 1999; Boyer and Dickerson, 2003; Molde et al., 2010; Brevers et 
al., 2011), on PG and impulsivity (Specker et al., 1995; Vitaro et al., 1999; Lightsey and 
Hulsey, 2002), on PG and decision making ( Petry, 2001; Cavedini et al, 2002; 
Goudriaan et al., 2006; Lakey et al., 2007), for a review see van Holst et al. (2009). 
However, despite the increase in the interest in gambling, most studies focus mainly on 
PG and use non-pathological gamblers as control groups.  
Focusing mainly on PGs, which in England and Scotland represent the 0.5% of 
the population (Wardle et al., 2014), could lead to under researching a broader part of 
the population that gambles and under the right circumstances could be at risk of 
developing a gambling addiction. According to the Health surveys in England and 
Scotland in 2012 0.5% of the population are problem gamblers, 4.2% are at risk with 
Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) > 1 (Ferris and Wynne, 2001). Furthermore, 
65% have responded that they had gambled the year before the survey. Internationally 
gambling participation ranges between 65 and 82 percent (for a review see Gainsbury, 
2013) of the adult population.  The above clearly point to the direction that gambling 
prevalence is well established in the majority of the population creating a solid base for 
potential problem gambling. 
A second element that could potentially increase the prevalence of gambling and 
add to problem gambling is the vast increase in the number of gambling commercial 
spots in TV. Ofcom (2013) reported that between 2005 and 2012 gambling spots 
increased from 90k to almost 1.4 million (Wardle et al., 2012). The increase is indeed 
very worrying as it now results to almost two gambling commercial spot viewings per 
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day per adult increasing significantly the exposure time since 2005. Most gambling 
researchers agree that increasing exposure and gambling availability should lead to an 
increase to gambling participation and problem gambling (Binde, 2014). At the moment 
and to the author’s best knowledge, there is no measurement of the direct impact that 
advertising and exposure to gambling stimuli could have on prevalence of problem 
gambling (Binde, 2014), although there are studies that argue that there should be a fair 
impact (Planzer and Wardle, 2011; Williams et al., 2012).  
The above highlight the need to explore the effect of gambling stimuli on 
individuals. In this program of research we focused on the effects of gambling stimuli 
on attentional bias, time perception, and effects on risk and decision making. We 
hypothesized that gambling stimuli can lead to intrusive cognitions either directly 
(attentional bias, time perception) or indirectly (gambling priming effects on decision 
making, time perception, and craving to gamble). 
Attentional Bias 
Generally attentional bias refers to the phenomenon where, for a number of 
various reasons (e.g. threat, anxiety, or addiction related stimuli), we may pay more 
attention to specific things to the expense of others that may be present at a given 
moment. For example people who suffer from arachnophobia could get distracted by the 
presence of a spider to expense of other stimuli in the environment or could detect a 
spider faster than people with no fear for spiders (e.g. Mogg and Bradley, 2006). This 
attentional bias towards threatening stimuli, especially in people with anxiety, has been 
well documented (for a review see Cisler and Koster, 2010).  
Similarly, in addiction the term attentional bias refers to the phenomenon that 
substance users display differential attention towards their addiction related stimuli 
compared to neutral, non-related stimuli (e.g. Field and Cox, 2008; Field, Munafo, and 
Franken, 2009; Vizcaino et al., 2013). Robinson and Berridge (1993) argue that is due 
to increased salience for the substance related cues. Since attention is a limited resource 
if the bigger part of it is required to process substance related stimuli then less resources 
are left to process for neutral stimuli. 
GAMBLING STIMULI AND INTRUSIVE COGNITIONS  5 
 
This attentional bias is a robust phenomenon and has been demonstrated in a 
number of different addictions like alcohol (Sharma, Albery, and Cook, 2001; 
Townshend and Duka, 2001), nicotine (Ehrman et al., 2002; Munafo et al., 
2003;Walters et al., 2003), cannabis (Field, Mogg, and Bradley, 2004; Cane, Sharma, 
and Albery, 2009), cocaine (Copersino et al., 2004), heroine (Waters, Marhe, and 
Franken, 2012), and opioids (Lubman et al., 2000) among others. These studies 
involved a variety of methods like attentional blink, visual probe task, and Stroop test. 
The results from studies using the Stroop test are even more intriguing as they show that 
addiction stimuli can also have more persistent, carry over effect over the stimuli that 
follow them directly. 
Originally, Stroop (1935) presented colour words either written in the same 
colour or different as the one they expressed (e.g. word RED written with red ink or 
another colour). Stroop observed that people took longer to read the word when the ink 
colour was different than the word. This was known as the Stroop effect and was 
attributed to conflicting processes. The emotional Stroop task is based on the original 
Stroop task, but this time the words are not colours but words that can have an 
emotional impact, like war or kill, again written in different colours. It has been found 
that people are slower in reporting the colour of the “ink” for emotional words 
compared to neutral words. We should note though the original Stroop effect and the 
emotional Stroop effect are due to different conflicting processes (McKenna and 
Sharma, 1995, 2004).  
A further adaptation of the emotional Stroop test was the addiction Stroop test 
were this time emotional words were replaced with addiction related words. More 
specifically half the words were addiction related words and half were neutral words. 
Generally, substance abusers were slower in naming the colour of a substance related 
word compared to naming the colour for a neutral word (for a review see Cox, Fadardi, 
and Pothos, 2006). In most cases this addiction Stroop effect was only observed in 
substance abusers but not in healthy population, there are however some exceptions 
(e.g. Bauer and Cox, 1998; Clarke, Sharma, and Salter, 2014) 
Further to the immediate (fast effect) interference on naming the colour of the 
emotional or addiction related word McKenna and Sharma (2004) also established the 
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existence of a carryover interference of the salient stimulus to neutral items that 
followed it (slow effect). In other words substance abusers were not only slower at 
naming the colour of an addiction related word but also at naming the colour of neutral 
words that followed it directly. This is in line with the Elaborative Intrusion theory 
(Kavanagh, Andrade, and May, 2005) which proposes that addiction cues initiate a loop 
of associative and desire thoughts that could occupy a part of our cognitive resources 
even when the cue is no longer present (this theory will be discussed in more detail in 
the Decision Making and Gambling section).  
As mentioned above even though pathological gambling is not a substance 
abuse addiction it still presents similarities with substance addictions. Robinson and 
Berridge’s incentive-sensitization theory (1993, 2003) suggests that repeated gambling 
experiences, thus exposure to gambling related stimuli, could lead to brain sensitization 
increasing the salience of these stimuli and associating them with reward sensations. 
This association could motivate a pathological gambler to gamble even if there are no 
gambling cues presents. Most importantly though, this salience increase could now lead 
to attentional biases similar to the ones observed in substance abuses. 
Indeed, there is a number of studies that used a modified addiction Stroop test 
(gambling Stroop test) to investigate attentional bias in pathological gamblers. The 
findings were consistent with other addictions, pathological gamblers were slower at 
reporting the colour of gambling related words than of neutral words (McCusker and 
Gettings, 1997; Boyer and Dickerson, 2003; Molde et al., 2010). However, as most of 
other studies on attentional biases in gambling that used other than Stroop paradigms, 
these studies compared pathological gamblers with non-pathological gamblers or with 
people who do not gamble at all.  
In order to investigate if increased exposure to gambling stimuli (e.g. TV 
commercials) could potentially lead non-pathological gamblers to gamble we argue that 
the sample of the research should be more representative of the general population. It is 
therefore vital to look for intrusive cognitions and attentional biases due to gambling 
related stimuli in general and not just in pathological gamblers. This is highlighted even 
more by existing research that found attentional biases towards addiction stimuli even in 
healthy populations.  
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Studies in alcohol addiction (Bauer and Cox, 1998; Clarke, Sharma, and Salter, 
experiment 1, 2014) have found that even healthy (not addicted) drinkers demonstrated 
attentional bias towards alcohol related stimuli. A possible explanation for these 
findings could be that alcohol salience is high even in healthy population. Furthermore, 
in the second Clarke, Sharma, and Salter (experiment 2, 2014) found that when 
participants were not primed the attentional bias effect disappeared which highlights the 
need to investigate the role of priming in attentional bias. 
Time Perception 
If we imagine ourselves facing a pleasant experience, either an exciting lecture 
or being lucky and winning on a social poker game amongst friends, then we most 
probably say that time seemed to fly. On the other hand, if we imagine ourselves facing 
an unpleasant experience, like waiting in a hospital queue after an injury we would most 
probably say that time seemed to stand still. Therefore, we could argue that time 
perception is subjective to our emotional or arousal circumstances (Droit-Volet and 
Meck, 2007; Tipples, 2008; Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009; Wittman, 2009). 
Scientists have argued that humans are equipped with an internal clock 
mechanism that allows us to accurately estimate time. The most popular internal clock 
model is the one proposed by the scalar timing theory (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 
1984). The model consists of three distinct stages, the clock stage, the memory stage, 
and the decision stage (Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009). In the clock stage, a pacemaker is 
generating pulses throughout the duration of an event; a mode switch is either allowing 
the pulses to be carried to the accumulator or not. In simple words, when our attention 
is focused on the event then the mode switch stays on and the generated pulses gather in 
the accumulator. When we are distracted, mode switch could be turned off disallowing 
the pulses from reaching the accumulator. The accumulator then passes the number of 
the collected pulsesto the memory and decision stages where the comparator concludes 
if the event we experienced was short (small number of accumulated pulses) or long 
(larger number of accumulated pulses). 
Although there has been some criticism on its validity (Lewis and Miall, 2006; 
Mattel and Meck, 2004), the internal clock model is still the most prominent one. The 
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main reason is that it can be used to interpret findings from a wide spectrum of studies 
due to the fact that the model allows different factors to interact with the pacemaker and 
the mode switch. Hence, it can provide the foundation for investigating the parameters 
that can lead to distorted time perception. 
A number of studies has provided evidence that arousal can have a direct impact 
on time perception mainly by affecting the pacemaker, thus affecting the rate at which 
pulses are generated. Cheng et al. (2007) have shown that administering drugs that 
increase arousal results in overestimating the elapsed interval which is associated with 
an accelerated pacemaker. On the other hand, Drew et al. (2003) have shown that 
administering drugs that reduce arousal results in underestimation which is associated 
with the pacemaker slowing down.  
Arousal also seems to play a role on how emotion affects the internal clock. 
Angrilli et al. (1997) found that at high arousal levels, the duration of negative pictures 
was overestimated compared to positive pictures, whereas at low arousal levels, the 
effect was reversed and the duration of negative pictures was underestimated compared 
to positive pictures. This could indicate again that at high arousal levels the pacemaker 
is accelerating and thus generating more pulses. Furthermore, negative stimuli are 
associated with avoidance strategies in order to escape threatening situations 
(Duckworth et al., 2002). This could result in high arousal, negative stimuli could 
accelerate the pacemaker resulting in temporal overestimation compared to positive or 
neutral stimuli (Droit-Volet and Meck, 2007; Tipples, 2008; Tipples, 2011; Yamada and 
Kawabe, 2011). 
Besides arousal, attention can also affect our time perception. Losing our 
attention would result in the mode switch switching off thus not allowing the generated 
pulses to reach the accumulator. This would lead to fewer pulses being accounted thus 
perceiving the event as shorter (temporal underestimation). Music is known to have 
such a shortening effect on time perception (Droit-Volet et al., 2010). Participants 
listened to either happy (major key) or sad (minor key) music. Compared to control 
group (listened to sine wave), both sad and happy music were perceived as shorter. 
Even though results suggested that listening to music distracts our attention resulting in 
lost pulses some argue that music could also have an effect on the pacemaker too. 
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Participants may have felt more relaxed, since listening to music is mostly an enjoyable 
experience, resulting in a slowed down pacemaker (Droit-Volet et al., 2010). 
Distinguishing between effects on arousal or attention can pose a challenge, however 
Brule and Casini (2001) have shown that arousal-related and attention-related effects 
are independent and can have an additive effect on time perception. 
A more clear demonstration on how attention can affect our time perception 
comes from studies that manipulated the number of changes that occur in a situation. In 
particular, Ahn et al. (2009) found that events with more changes are perceived as 
shorter compared to events with less changes. In their study participants were assigned 
to two different groups and were shown a slide show of five pictures being presented 
five times each for five seconds. The main difference was that one group show the first 
picture being presented five consecutive times before the second picture would be 
presented for another five consecutive times and so on until all five pictures were 
presented five times (if pictures were named as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 then the slide show 
would be 1/1/1/1/1 then 2/2/2/2/2 then 3/3/3/3/3 and so on). The second group would 
again see all five pictures being presented five times each but in quasirandom order 
(1/2/3/4/5 then 3/2/1/5/4 then 1/3/5/2/4 then 3/1/5/4/2 and finally 5/4/3/2/1). The latter 
slide show would be perceived to present more changes compared to the first slide show 
due to the fact that each current picture would be different than the previous one.  
Generalising these findings one could argue that more diverse situations (more 
changes or details in a situation) may be perceived as shorter compared to less diverse 
ones (less changes or details). Furthermore, even the same situation could be perceived 
differently depending on the on the actual state of mind that we are in at a given 
moment. Hansen and Trope (2013) have hypothesised that placing ourselves in low-
level or high-level construals could affect our time perception. This is due to the fact 
that high-level construals tend to be abstract mental representations were we focus less 
in details. On the other hand, low-level construals are more concrete representations 
were we focus more on details thus being able to perceive more changes. Therefore, 
individuals who are in concrete construals (either by real life factors or experimental 
priming) should perceive the duration of events as shorter, compared to individuals who 
are in abstract construals. 
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Summarising, one can argue that arousal, attention, and state of mind (abstract 
vs. concrete) can have an effect on time perception. Gambling stimuli could be 
associated with a harmful addiction hence be perceived as threatening stimuli and affect 
our pacemaker. They could also be associated with the recreational side of gambling, 
where one could have fun and perhaps win some money. In that case gambling stimuli 
would be more of an attentional distraction affecting our switch mode. In either case, 
our overall experience of time could be affected by the mental state that we are in at 
given moment (abstract vs. concrete). Hence, it is important to investigate the effects of 
gambling stimuli in different experimental settings not only on time perception but also 
look into possible effects on gambling decisions and craving to gamble. 
Decision Making and Gambling 
 Decision making is a rather complex topic and lies at the heart of human 
behaviour as we resort to it for answering a wide variety of questions, from very simple 
ones like what to wear this morning or to vastly more complicated ones like future 
career decisions (Krawczyk, 2002). A number of theories and factors have been 
identified to affect our decisions (varying from e.g. emotion (Paulus and Yu, 2012), 
self-esteem (Josephs et al., 1992), reward and punishment (Coventry, 2001), gender 
differences and physiological arousal (Coventry and Hudson, 2001)).  
In its fundamental sense though of processing information and arriving to a 
decision based on probabilities and outcomes the foundations were set by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944) with their Expected Utility theory (EU). EU stated that when 
faced with a number of possible decision we take the one with the highest value or 
utility (Josephs et al., 1992). However, this theory fails to incorporate the different 
psychological processes (like the ones mentioned above) and has received lots of 
criticism (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have proposed the Prospect Theory (PT) that 
implements the factor of risk and the notion that risk in not a constant but a variable that 
can change depending on the situation. This distinction provides more space for 
psychological processes to be implemented as factors that underlie risk. Probably the 
most famous example from PT is the reflection effect between two scenarios that 
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involve gain or loss. In the first scenario participants had to choose between a certain 
gain of $800 and an 85% chance of winning $1,000. Most participants demonstrated 
risk aversion by choosing the certainty of winning $800. However, in the second 
scenario participants had to choose between a certain loss of $80 and an 85% chance of 
losing $100. Most participants chose the 85% chance of losing $100. This change in 
preference is called reflection effect.  
In gambling however behaviours are not so clearly defined. Most gambling 
games are designed to offer a very small chance of winning compared to losing and 
despite the fact that the certain win would be not to gamble people still choose to 
gamble. This suggests that decision making when it comes to gamble cannot be 
described fully by risk aversion as explained in PT. Therefore, there is the need to adopt 
a model that will include a sufficient number of psychological factors. 
One such model is the Elaborated Intrusion theory of Desire (EI) (Kavanagh, 
Andrale, and May, 2005). The theory was originally formulated to explain craving for 
substance addiction but it can be generalised to apply to other harmful behaviours like 
gambling (pathological or recreational). The theory describes how automatic elaborative 
processes can trigger intrusive desire thoughts (see figure 1.1). External factors or 
events that precede the intrusive thoughts can lead to automatic components of desire 
and also act as cues that will then lead to the elaborative stage where cognitive 
processes retrieve information from the memory. This creates a vicious circle where 
desire thoughts have a central place and they keep being reinforced by the external 
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Figure 1.1 The Elaborative Intrusion Theory of Desire as presented in Kavanagh, Andrade, and May 
(2005) 
 
Figure 1.1 Rounded boxes represent external factors or antecedents, rectangular boxes represent the 
products or elaborative processes. Automatic processes (thin arrow) lead to spontaneous intrusive 
thoughts, then an elaborative circle (thick arrows) begins where previous experiences are associated with 
these intrusive thoughts to create images with the desired activity. The elaborative circle can feed back to 
create more automatic influence that reinforce the whole process. 
 
Imagine you are watching a football game where betting related stimuli are 
presented either as commercial signs in the stadium or as commercials during half time. 
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These external cues are processed automatically and could initiate spontaneous thoughts 
about betting. At this point elaborated processes are also triggered that associate these 
stimuli with betting maybe linking them with previous betting experience. Desire 
thoughts are now being reinforced by both the betting advertising stimuli (external cues) 
and betting related memories (elaborative processing) creating imaginary projections 
(imagery) of yourself of winning money from a successful bet. This imagery stage plays 
a crucial role in maintaining the desire to bet and increasing craving. 
The EI theory fits very well with the predictions from attentional bias since 
increased desire and craving should lead to intrusive thoughts making us more 
vulnerable to gambling stimuli. Furthermore, stronger imagery could result in a more 
concrete mind set where we imagine in more details the process of betting and possible 
outcomes. This, as discussed in the time perception section, should have a direct effect 
on time perception. Therefore, it is crucial to establish measurements for desire and 
craving to gamble, either implicit or explicit, as it is rational to argue that the stronger 
the desire and craving to gamble the stronger the effects of attentional bias and distorted 
time perception should be.   
Further support to a possible mechanism that connects attentional bias and 
craving to gamble comes from Franken’s model about substance abuse and craving 
(Franken, 2003). Even though the model was originally used to account for substance 
abuse it can be generalised to account for non-substance related addictions (Hønsi et al., 
2013). Franken argues that selective attention allows the addict to focus on relevant 
stimuli and disregard irrelevant ones. Furthermore, due to increased dopamine levels, 
attentional bias will lead to increased craving for gamble which will eventually lead to 
enhanced attentional bias towards gambling related stimuli. So the model suggests that 
attentional bias and craving are interconnected and can lead relapse (Figure 1.2) 
In more detail attentional bias could lead to gambling activities in three possible 
ways (Figure 1.2). First, maintaining a gambling behaviour could be due to increased 
likelihood to attend to gambling related stimuli in the environment. This would be an 
automatic process where gambling related stimuli are processed more easily and 
rapidly. Second, once attention is directed towards a gambling stimulus it is difficult to 
redirect attention to different stimuli. This is also in line with the EI theory’s subjective 
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state of desire and Tiffany’s approach (1990), as it will be discussed in more detail 
below.  Furthermore, in line again with the EI theory, this attentional bias towards 
gambling stimuli could lead to intrusive cognitions that could increase craving and urge 
to gamble. Finally, the automatic attention bias towards gambling stimuli could lead to 
reduced attention resources left to process competitive cues to gambling. As an example 
we could imagine a poster against gambling that does actually contain gambling images 
and the message “gambling is an addiction that damages lives”. Due to attention 
focused on the gambling stimuli themselves limited resources are left to process the 
message itself, thus reducing its effectiveness. 
Figure 1.2. Summary of the model as proposed by Franken (2003) 
 
Figure 1.2. Dashed lined boxes represent the three possible ways that attentional bias towards gambling 
stimuli could lead to craving and relapse to gamble. Continuous line demonstrated how attentional bias 
and craving affect one another. 
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The above discussed models highlight the role that automatic and non-automatic 
process play in attentional bias, craving and addictive behaviours. Even though the 
models were originally focusing on substance abuse they can be generalised to include 
non-substance addiction. A third model that uses automatic activation of schemata that 
can activate non-automatic mechanisms that create urge and craving to relapse was 
proposed by Tiffany in 1990. Tiffany’s approach focuses on how automatic and non-
automatic processes are intertwined and can lead to creating and maintain urges to use 
substance. In our case we can argue that this relation can lead to increased craving to 
gamble.  
Tiffany suggested that in addiction, behaviour is mainly controlled by automatic 
processes. This could mean that an addict’s behaviour, and hence using and reusing 
substances, is largely affected by the presence of external stimuli related to his/her 
addiction. These external stimuli can lead to effortless attentional bias which would be 
difficult to counteract and direct attention elsewhere. In other words, external factors 
can activate substance-abuse schemata which then could activate non-automatic 
processes related to the addiction and lead to relapse. This “schemata activation” can 
then lead to non-automatic processing that can materialise into craving and urge to use 
addiction substance.  
The implications from Tiffany’s approach to gambling are in line with Franken’s 
model and the EI theory. Gambling stimuli can automatically cause attentional bias and 
activate related schemata, this attentional bias can then maintain attention to the 
gambling stimuli making it more difficult to direct attention to non-related stimuli. At 
the same non-automatic processes can enhance craving and urge to relapse. This 
increased craving then feed back to increase attentional bias even more making it more 
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Assessing Craving 
The EI theory places desire thoughts and craving at the centre of the model, it is 
however important to highlight that desire thoughts and craving will not always result in 
gambling. Craving to gamble could sometimes be subtle and people who actually 
gamble may not always notice that they craved for gambling (Ashrafioun and 
Rosenberg, 2012). Therefore, it is important to develop implicit and explicit measures 
of intrusive cognitions that lead to craving and desire to gamble. 
A number of questionnaires has been developed to assess craving to gamble 
since pathological gambling was listed as an impulse disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980), for a detailed review read Ashrafioun and Rosenberg (2012). 
However, for the purposes of this research program and since we are focusing on 
intrusive cognitions that could lead to desire thoughts and craving we decided to use the 
Gambling Craving Scale (GACS) by Young and Wohl (2009). GACS includes three 
factors that reflect the desire to gamble, the anticipation of gambling in the near future, 
and the relief from negative consequences that could follow gambling. These three 
subscales combined give an overall mean score of craving. 
The CAGS fits very well with the traditional view of craving in substance abuse, 
where craving could be a product of desire for substance use or a mere product of 
withdrawal symptom (Tiffany and Conklin, 2000). Originally it included four different 
factors (desire to gamble, anticipation of positive experiences from gambling, intention 
to gamble, and relief from negative experiences associated with gambling) and 18 items 
in total. Participants had to give their responses on a 7-point scale between 1(strongly 
agree) and 7 (strongly disagree). After testing the questionnaire for three years with 
Canadian University students Young and Wohl finalised GACS with three factors and 
nine items in total, Anticipation (e.g. Gambling would be fun right now), Desire (e.g. I 
crave for gambling right now), and Relief (If I were gambling now, I could think more 
clearly). The final selected items had a factor loading  > .55 to their respective factor, as 
suggested by Comrey and Lee (1992). Nine items did not meet that criterion and were 
dropped, also the intention to gamble factor was dropped as it was semantically very 
close to desire to gamble. 
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The CAGS has the advantage of measuring overall craving and providing three 
different subscale score using a small number of items. Furthermore, it has been used 
together with the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI; Ferris and Wynne, 2001) 
and DSM-IV checklist for pathological gambling (APA, 1994), (for more information 
on PGSI and DSM-IV see Study 1  methods section) which provides a valuable sample 
for comparison both for our current studies but also for future ones. In addition, GACS 
has demonstrated high level of concurrent validity with University students (Young and 
Wohl, study 1,2009; Ashrafioun and Rosenberg, 2012), this again is of high importance 
as our convenience sample comprises of University students. This high level of 
concurrent validity was also found with samples that included pathological gamblers 
(Young and Wohl, studies 2 and 3, 2009), which will allow us to compare our current 
findings with future replications of our studies with more diverse samples. 
Overview 
 In Study 1 we tested the hypothesis that gambling stimuli can cause intrusive 
cognitions by using a gambling Stroop paradigm. Additionally we tested the hypothesis 
that these intrusive cognitions can affect time perception by comparing time production 
performance prior and after the gambling Stroop. Furthermore, we investigate whether 
participants would be willing to take higher risks in a gambling task as a result of 
gambling intrusive cognitions. 
 In Studies 2 and 3 we focused on the effects of gambling intrusive cognitions on 
time perception, however we replaced the time production task with a time bisection 
task, either completing the task once (Study 2) or completing the task twice with a 
priming task between attempts (Study 3). 
 Finally we hypothesized that gambling intrusive cognitions would result in 
higher gambling craving, which was measured in all three studies together with 
screening participants for pathological gamblers 
Ethics 
Prior to advertising all four studies and testing participants; ethics applications were 
submitted to the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology in Kent University. 
Approval codes were, 20133012 for Study 1 and 20133041 for Studies 2 and 3. In all 
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four studies participants were briefed both orally and by reading a print out and they 
provided their signed consent forms. They were informed about their right to withdraw 
either during the study or in the future after their participation was concluded. Upon the 
completion of the study they received both oral and printed debriefing where they were 
reminded of their right to withdraw from the study either that moment or at any point in 
the future if they desired so by contacting either the experimenter or the experiment 
supervisor. 
 Study 1 
In Study 1 we investigated whether gambling stimuli would result in higher intrusive 
cognitions compared to neutral stimuli. We used a modified gambling Stroop task 
where performance in naming the colour of gambling related items would be compared 
to the performance of naming the colour of neutral items. The addiction Stroop task in 
general has been modified and used in a wider spectrum of addictions (Cane et al., 
2009). For this research we modified it using images instead of words, either related to 
gambling or not. Our first hypothesis was that participants in the gambling prime 
condition (containing both gambling and neutral images) would be overall slower in 
reporting the stimuli colour compared to participants in the neutral prime condition 
(containing only neutral images). Secondly, in the gambling priming condition 
participants would be slower in naming the colour of a gambling images compared to 
naming the colour of a neutral images (the fast effect), thirdly participants would be 
slower in naming the colour of a neutral image following a gambling image compared 
to a neutral following another neutral image (the slow effect). 
Furthermore, we wanted to test whether the possible attentional bias in the gambling 
Stroop would result in longer lasting intrusive cognitions. Particularly, we hypothesized 
that these intrusive cognitions would affect time perception. We used a time production 
paradigm where participants had to carry out a task for exactly 20 sec. According to 
time perception literature, if participants would perceive time flowing faster they should 
produce longer intervals, whereas if they perceived time flowing slower they would 
produce shorter intervals (e.g. Hansen and Trope, 2013 , Droit-Volet 2009, Droit-Volet 
2004).  
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We also investigated whether these intrusive cognitions would affect participants’ 
willingness to take risks and gamble. We used a gambling paradigm where participants 
were given a specific amount of money and offered five different risk options (Josephs 
et al., 1992). We hypothesized that intrusive cognitions resulted from the gambling 
Stroop should provide strong cues that could lead to higher risk taking (Kanavagh et al, 
2005). Finally, we measured gambling craving and we hypothesized that higher 
intrusive cognitions effects should correlate with higher craving. As with Studies 2 and 
3 all participants had to complete the DSM-IV gambling questionnaires and PGSI 
questionnaires, mainly to establish that our sample was representative of the general 
population and also use these measurements as a point of reference in future replications 
of the study with gambling addicted samples. 
Hypotheses 
1. Time Production Task: Participants in the gambling condition will have different time 
perception than those in the control condition.  
2. Stroop Task: Participants will be slower in reporting the colour of a gambling related 
image compared to a non-gambling related image (neutral image) (fast effect). 
Furthermore, participants in the gambling condition will be slower in reporting the 
colour of a neutral image if it was preceded by a gambling related image (slow effect).  
3. Gambling Task: Participants in the gambling condition should be primed to gamble 
more compared to participants in the non-gambling condition. 
4. Craving: Participants in the gambling condition should demonstrate higher craving 
for gambling compared to the ones in the control condition. 




Eighty-two participants, (age range 18-50, mean age = 20.42, SD = 5.33, 74 females, 
eight males) were recruited via the Kent Psychology RPS website and were awarded 
with 2 RPS credits for their participation.  
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 Design 
 Participants were randomly allocated in one of two priming groups, Gambling or 
Neutral. Both priming groups went through the same number of stages with the only 
difference being the images shown during the Stroop test. The Gambling prime group 
carried out a Gambling modified Stroop test that contained gambling and neutral stimuli 
(in equal proportion), the Neutral priming group  carried out a Stroop test that contained 
only neutral stimuli, as explained further in the Design and Materials sections. 
Study 1 involved the measurement of three dependent measures and three 
questionnaires. For all participants the three dependent measures were recorded before 
presenting the questionnaires. A visual representation of Study 1 is provided in figure 
2.1. 
Gambling Stroop.  A mixed design defined by Priming Group (gambling, neutral) x 
Image type (gambling or neutral). Priming group was a between-subjects factors and 
Image type a withing-subject factor. The dependent measure was the reaction time (RT) 
it took to respond to the colour in which the image had been filtered with.   
Time production. A mixed design defined by priming group (gambling, neutral) as the 
between subjects factor and Time Production (first or second time) as the within-
subjects factor. The dependent measure was the duration (in seconds) of the task. 
Gambling Task.  A mixed design defined by priming group (gambling or neutral) x 
Gambling Task (0%, 50%, 75%, 90%, 99% risk). Gambling Task varied within 
subjects, the dependent measure was the risk percentage selected by the participant. 
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Image Stroop containing five neutral images. 
 
Slide show of five neutral items with a total 
duration of 20 sec. 
 
Image Stroop containing five images. Participants 
were instructed to manually stop at 20 sec. 
Gambling or Neutral Stroop test depending on the 
Prime Condition. Twenty-four gambling and 24 
neutral images shown in four different colours or 
48 neutral images in four colours. 
 
Slide show of five neutral items with a total 
duration of 20 sec. 
 
Image Stroop containing five images. Participants 
were instructed to manually stop at 20 sec. 
Gambling Task involved four questions with £250, 
£40, £25, and £2. Each option offered five 
alternative options, 0% (no gamble), 50%, 75%, 
90%, and 99% risk. 
 
Completion of DSM-IV, PGSI, Craving 
questionnaires. 
Figure 2.1. Study 1 flow chart. Rectangles represent between subjects tasks, rounded 
rectangles represent within subjects, and ovals represent practice or training sessions. 




 Hardware and software. The study was conducted in the labs of Psychology 
department where each participant was alone in an individual cubicle. The experiment 
was presented on a Psychology department Dell desktop computer with a 19 inches 
monitor (4:3 factor). The custom computer software used to present the stimuli was 
programmed in Psychopy v1.77 (Peirce, 2007 and Peirce, 2009).  
Visual stimuli. The stimuli collection consisted of 73 neutral images and 24 gambling 
images. Initially we selected 24 gambling images (we used Google images for this 
process, using the term “gambling images” as a search criterion (Google, 2013). These 
objects were commonly associated with gambling and have been selecting in numerous 
papers on gambling (e.g. roulette, dice, cards, poker chips as in Brevers et al., 2011).  
Each gambling object was then matched with two neutral objects with similar physical 
and visual properties (e.g. shape, colour, size). This resulted in 24 triads, a further 25 
neutral objects were selected for the training and practice sessions, hence the total 
number of 73 neutral objects.  
Each image was resized to 1024x768 pixels and converted to 256 greyscale. We then 
applied four different filters and generated four final images from each item. These 
filters were applied in Adobe Photoshop® with 40% opacity and were red(255,0,0), 
green(0,255,0), blue(0,0,255), and yellow(255,255,0). All image sizes were smaller than 
200kb in order to avoid differences in loading times. Further details on how these 
images were presented in the study are reported in the procedure section. Four separate 
gambling question slides were created in Microsoft® PowerPoint® in order to cover all 
different combinations between gambling risks (0%-50%-75%-90%-99%). These slides 
were exported as JPG images with dimensions 960x720. 
Questionnaires. We used computerised versions of DSM-IV gambling questionnaire, 
PGSI and GACS, as mentioned in the introduction. The items and instructions were 
typed in exactly as shown in their paper version .The items of each questionnaire were 
typed in separate slides and were presented in a sequential order as in the paper 
versions. Both DSM-IV and PGSI ask the participant to recall activities and behaviour 
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for the last 12 months “In the last 12 months…” (e.g. When you gamble how often do 
you go back another day to win back money lost?). Participants were offered the options 
of “never”, “sometimes”, “most of the time”, and “always” for the nine items of the 
PGSI (Appendix B) questionnaire and they that were scored with 0, 1, 2, 3 respectively. 
For nine out of ten items in the DSM-IV (Appendix A) questionnaires the options were 
“never”, “occasionally”, “fairly often”, and “very often” scored with 0, 1, 2, 3 
respectively. One item offered the options of “never”, “some of the time I lost”, “most of 
the time”, and “every time I lost” and they were scored with 0, 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
The GACS questionnaire includes nine items that ask the participant to select the 
response that matches his/her current feelings (Appendix C). Participants had to respond 
between 1 “Strongly Agree” and 7 “Strongly disagree”; the third item was negatively 
word to check for response bias (Young and Wohl, 2009). This implies that the lower 
average scores would reveal higher craving. Since the questionnaires were presented via 
computer software participants had to register their response by pressing the 
corresponding number on the keyboard. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival participants were briefed about the experiment and were asked to sign a 
consent form, they also had to complete the demographics form before proceeding in 
the lab. Participants were then informed that prior to each computer based task 
instructions will be shown on the monitor and that if those instructions were unclear 
they should call the experimenter for assistance. The study was made by a series of 
eight steps (see figure 2.1).  These steps are described below in the order that the 
participants completed them. 
Stroop practice 1. Participants performed an image Stroop test with five neutral items, 
each item was presented in red, green, blue, and yellow in random order. We used five 
different objects in four different filters and repeated them five times resulting in 100 
trials. The participant had to respond to the colour of the image as fast and as accurately 
as possible by pressing A, S, K, and L for red, green, blue, and yellow respectively. 
There was a random intertrial interval varying from 16 to 32ms that corresponded to 
either one or two frame loading times. In practice there was no intertrial interval set but 
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the frame buffer required one or two frames in order to load and show the next stimulus. 
The same principal applied to all the following image showing steps. 
Stroop viewing 1. Participants were instructed that they would watch a slide show that 
would alst exactly 20 sec and for the duration of the slide show they would only have to 
watch and and not perform any actions. The slide show presented five neutral items 
(different than those in Stroop practice 1) in the four different colour filters mentioned 
above resulting in 20 items. The images were presented in random order and the total 
duration of the slide shown was exactly 20 sec. Each image would stay on the screen for 
a time interval randomly varying between 500ms and 1000ms to simulate the conditions 
of the gambling Stroop task.  
Time production 1. Participants performed an image Stroop test with five items 
(different than those in the above two steps) presented in the four different colour filters 
mentioned above. The instructions were that they had to carry out the task for exactly 
20 sec and when they felt that the elapsed time was exactly 20 sec they should terminate 
the task by hitting the “Enter” or “Return” key.  
Priming group.  Participants were randomly assigned to either the gambling or neutral 
prime group. Both groups completed the Stroop task but with different types of images. 
Both versions of the Stroop test included 192 items (48 items x 4 filter colours). In the 
gambling prime group  24 items were gambling related and 24 neutral. In the neutral 
prime group the 24 gambling items were replaced with a second set of 24 neutral items 
(neutral2). The task involved watching a stimulus appearing on the screen and the 
participant had to report the colour of the filter as fast and as accurately as possible by 
pressing the corresponding key. 
Stroop viewing 2. Identical to Stroop viewing 1 above but with a new stimuli set. 
Time production 2.  Identical to Time production 1 but with a different stimuli set. 
This was the last task that used the visual Stroop paradigm in Study 1. 
Gambling Task. Participants had to give their choice of action in four different 
scenarios where they had to imagine that they were given £250, £40, £25 or £2. These 
four scenarios were presented in random order and each contained five possible choices, 
no gamble (0% risk of losing), 1:2 winning odds (50% risk of losing), 1:4 odds (75% 
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risk of losing), 1:10 odds (90% risk of losing), and 1:100 odds (99% risk of losing). It 
should be noted that the winning odds were presented and not the losing risk (e.g. 
“Imagine you have £2, which bet would be willing to make?” choice 1. Bet at 50% 
chance of winning £4, choice 2. Bet at 25% chance of winning £8 and so on, for more 
details see Appendix D). Furthermore, there were no instructions on answering as 
quickly as possible, leaving each participant to answer when they felt comfortable with 
their choice. Once the choice was recorded for a scenario then the next scenario was 
presented on the screen. 
 Questionnaires. Instructions for each questionnaire were presented on the 
screen prior to the questionnaire. All three questionnaires were presented one after the 
other on the screen and participants reported their answer using keys “0-3” or “1-7” 
where appropriate. Completing all three questionnaires was the last phase of Study 1 at 
which point a message was displayed on the screen thanking the participants and 
notifying them to call the experimenter. 
Results and Discussion 
Questionnaires 
 The mean scores for all three questionnaires DSM-IV, PGSI, and GACS, were 
calculated for each participant. We also calculated the means for the three subscales of 
GACS, Anticipation, Deisre, and Relief. Two-way ANOVA’s were carried out in order 
to investigate for effect of Prime Group (gambling, neutral). There was a significant 
effect of Prime Group in DSM-IV scores, F = 4.09, df = 2, p = .047, and the mean 
scores for the gambling Prime Group (M = 0.67, SD = 1.65) appeared to be higher than 
the mean scores for the neutral Prime Group (M = .13, SD = 0.4). There was also a 
significant effect of Prime group in PGSI scores, F = 3.829, df = 2, p = .054, with 
gambling Prime Group mean M = .93 (SD = 1.45) and neutral Prime Group mean M = 
.43 (SD = 0.75). These two findings are in line with the literature that reports DSM-IV 
and PGSI as highly correlating. There was also a significant effect of Prime Group on 
the desire subscale, F = 3.887, df = 2, p = .052, with mean scores, M = 6.17 (SD = 
0.99) for the gambling Prime Group, and M = 6.58 (SD = 0.84) for the neutral group (as 
mentioned above, lower scores in GACS represent higher effect), which reveals a 
higher desire for gambling in the gambling Prime Group. 
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Stroop task 
 Data preparation. Prior to data analysis we removed all incorrect responses for 
each participant, this resulted in the loss of 657 cases (originally 15,744 cases, 4.01% 
wrong responses). We removed outliers defined as ±SD’s based on each participant and 
condition specifin mean; this resulted in 14,757 acceptable cases. Finally, we removed 
any responses faster than 300ms which led to a final sample containing 14,745 cases, 
overall reduction of 6.4%. 
 Data analysis. A Two-way ANOVA analysis was carried out on the mean 
correct reactions times (RT). The Prime Group (gambling, neutral) was a between-
subjects factor and Image type (gambling, neutral) was a within subjects factor. There 
was no significant main or interaction effect either of Priming group  or Image type  (all 
F’s < 1.042, p> .300). In the gambling Prime Group gambling stimuli were reported 
with a mean RT of 862ms ( SD = 127.13) and the neutral stimuli with a mean RT of 
870ms (SD = 148.45) (overall mean of 867ms, SD = 137.12). In the neutral Prime 
Group, the neutral were reported with an overall mean RT of 899ms ( SD = 156.17).The 
common stimuli (the same neutral stimuli that were presented in the gambling Prime 
Group) had a mean of 898ms (SD = 156.17). The second set of neutral stimuli (these are 
new neutral items that replaced the gambling items that were shown in the gambling 
Prime Group) had a mean of 900ms ( SD = 149.42). Furthermore, one-way ANOVA’s 
were carried out to investigate possible slow or fast effects. There were no significant 
findings (all F’s < .704, p > .311).  
 Fast and slow effects analysis. For the gambling Prime Group we also analysed 
correct reaction times in terms of fast and slow effects. The analysis involved a 3-way 
ANOVA with Prime Group as the between subjects factors, and previous image type 
(gambling, neutral) and current image type (gambling, neutral) as within subject factors. 
This analysis did not reveal any significant effects or interactions (all F’s < 0.704, all 
p’s > .404) 
 Correlational analysis with questionnaires. Next, correlational analysis was 
carried out in order to check if higher Stroop interference scores would be associated 
with stronger explicit measurements in the questionnaires. Two Stroop interference 
scores were calculated: the fast effect as the difference between gambling and neutral 
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image type when the previous image was neutral, and the slow effect as the difference 
between previous gambling image and previous neutral image when the current image 
is neutral. Analysis revealed that the slow effect was significantly correlated 
(marginally) with the Craving scores, r = -.28, p = .076, with Anticipation subscale 
scores, r = -.29, p = .058. All other correlations yielded insignificant results. There were 
no significant correlations between the fast effect and the questionnaires (all - .086 < r’s 
< .148) 
Time production 
Data preparation. During the initial data collection we noticed that five participants 
have not stopped the process manually as instructed, they kept doing the task until all 
possible trials were displayed (four repetitions of 20 stimuli, elapsed time between 60 
and 80 seconds). This posed the question whether these specific participants had 
understood the task and chose to continue or they had not understood the task and kept 
going until all the trials finished. We decided to exclude these five participants on the 
basis that we did not have enough evidence on whether they performed the task as 
instructed. Three of the excluded participants were in the Neutral condition and two in 
the Gambling condition, resulting in a final count of 37 participants in the Neutral and 
40 in the Gambling condition. 
Data analysis. Two-way ANOVA was carried out on the elapsed recorded durations. 
Prime group (gambling, neutral) was a between subjects factor and Attempt number 
(first, second) was a within subjects factor. There were no effects of attempt number or 
condition (Gambling vs Neutral group), all F’s < 0.508. For the Neutral condition, the 
mean durations of the time productions were, 33.31 seconds (SD = 13.45) and 31.14 
seconds (SD = 10.58)for the first and second attempt respectively. For the Gambling 
condition, the mean durations of the time productions were, 33.52 seconds (SD = 14.27) 
and 33.62 seconds (SD = 12.45) for the first and second attempt respectively. 
Furthermore, correlational analysis between first and second attempt revealed a 
significant correlation for the Gambling condition, r = .54, df = 38, p < .001 and an 
insignificant one for the Neutral condition, r = .227, df = 38, p = .177. These findings 
imply that in the Neutral condition participants’ time perception improves and they 
produce a second interval closer to 20 seconds. However, in the Gambling condition 
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both attempts are positively correlated and means are similar which could imply that 
there is interference from the Gambling Stroop that prevents participants from 
improving their time perception. 
Correlational analysis with questionnaires. A further correlational analysis was 
carried out between the time difference of the two attempts (difference) and the 
questionnaire scores in order to investigate possible relationships between participants’ 
performance in the time production task and their explicit responses. The difference was 
calculated by subtracting the Time production 1 interval from Time Production 2 
interval. Results did not reveal any significant correlations for the Gambling conditions. 
However, for the Neutral condition the difference was significantly correlated with the 
desire subscale,   r = .456, p = .005, and the DSM score, r = -.357, p = .03. Both are 
negative correlations (lower desire scores indicate a higher desire to gamble) suggesting 
that positive differences are related with reduced desire to gamble and lower DSM 
scores. 
Gambling Task 
Data preparation. Responses from each participant in each one of the gambling 
questions were coded as 0%, 50%, 75%, 90%, 99% for the “no gamble”, “50% chance 
to win”, “25% chance to win”, “10% chance to win”, “1% chance to win” 
respectively. This would allow us to extract mean risk responses per gambling question, 
with higher values resulting in higher risk taking. 
Data analysis. A two-way mixed ANOVA was carried out with Task (£250, £40, £25, 
£2) as within-subjects factor and Prime Group (gambling, neutral) as between-subjects 
factors. The analysis  revealed a significant effect of Task (money offered to gamble), F 
(3, 240) = 40.541, p < .001. There was no significant interaction between Task and 
Gambling Condition F(3, 240) = 0.279, p = .599. These results suggest that participants 
are more willing to gamble when the amount of money offered is little and as this 
amount goes up they take less risks. The means for each Task and Gambling Condition 
are summarized in table 2.1. Secondly, chi-square analysis was carried out for each 
Task in order to investigate for significant differences between the Pime Group  
(gambling, neutral). For the Tasks of £250, £25, and £2 there were no significant 
differences based on Prime group, χ²(4, N = 82) = 2.867, p = .58 , χ²(4, N = 82) = 5.739, 
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p = 2.19, χ²(4, N = 82) = .467, p = .98. However, for the Task of £40 the responses were 
different based on prime group, χ²(4, N = 82) = 12.525, p < 0.05. This finding could 
possibly imply that an amount of money around to £40 could be a sensitivity area in 
which participants were willing to gamble more when they were in the Gambling prime 
Condition. Perhaps a future repetition of Study 1 should focus more on finding more 
details on range of money that people would be more willing to risk gambling. 
 
Table 2.1: Means and standard deviation per money offered and Prime Group  
Task 
 £250 £40 £25 £2 
Prime 
Group 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Neutral .35 .31 .63 .32 .65 .32 .88 .21 
Gambling .43 .33 .65 .33 .70 .33 .87 .25 
 
 
Study 1 synopsis.  
In study 1 we hypothesised that we could detect that gambling stimuli could 
intrusive cognitions, mainly by affecting performance in the time perception task and 
also by causing a Stroop effect. However, our findings do not support our hypotheses. 
One possible explanation could be that gambling stimuli cannot cause such effects in 
general healthy (non-gamblers) population. However, it is also possible that the Stroop 
task is not suitable to detect these intrusive cognitions or the exposure to gambling 
stimuli in the Stroop task was not sufficient enough to prime participants for the 
gambling condition. Analysis of the questionnaires and the gambling task also did not 
provide evidence of intrusive cognitions than can affect time perception or desire and 
craving to gamble.  
Upon reflecting on the internal clock model we decided that the time production 
task may not be the appropriate one to detect time perception distortion due to intrusive 
cognition, furthermore the Stroop task may not be ideal for priming non-gamblers in a 
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gambling condition. Therefore, we decided to proceed with studies 2 and 3 where the 
time production task was replaced with a time bisection task that is more suitable in 
detecting different effects due to arousal or emotion.  
 
Study 2 
 Following up from Study 1 we decided to investigate time perception with a task 
that would be more sensitive in distinguishing between attention and arousal. The main 
reasoning was that gambling stimuli could either be perceived as threatening stimuli 
associated with an addiction or as exciting stimuli related to the fun side of casual 
gambling. Previous work on threatening stimuli (angry faces) (Droit-Volet et al., 2004; 
Tipples, 2008) has revealed an association between higher arousal and overestimating 
time intervals. Therefore, perceiving gambling stimuli as threatening should lead to 
overestimating their duration compared to neutral stimuli. Furthermore, with Study 2 we 
wanted to establish a baseline on gambling stimuli and their effect on time perception so 
we decided to remove any tasks that could have priming effects prior to the time 
perception task itself. However, we wanted to maintain the investigation between 
implicit and explicit measures and we kept the three questionnaires as offered in Study 
1, again at the end of Study2 
 In order to measure the effect of the gambling stimuli on time perception we 
decided to adopt a well-used paradigm that has demonstrated robust efficiency in 
discriminating between the effects of attention and arousal. We adopted the time 
bisection task as used in a number of studies (Droi-Volet et al., 2004; Tripples, 2008; 
Kramer et al., 2013) using neutral and gambling related stimuli. We hypothesized that if 
participants would find the gambling stimuli threatening they should overestimate their 
duration compared to neutral stimuli, whereas if they would find them exciting they 
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 Forty-five participants, (age range 18-37, mean age = 20.20, SD = 2.9, 37 
females, eight males) were recruited via the Kent Psychology RPS website and were 
awarded with 2 RPS credits for their participation.  
 
Design 
 The design involved was a Duration (400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, or 
1600ms) x Image Type (gambling or neutral) within-subjects design followed up by the 
DSM-IV, PGSI, and Craving questionnaire. The dependent measure were the proportion 
of “long” responses as it will be described in the Procedure and Results sections and the 
responses from the questionnaires. 
Materials 
 Following a similar design as in Kramer et al., (2013), we selected three neutral 
images and three gambling related images from the images used in Study 1. However, 
this time the images were left in their natural colours and were presented on 1,024 x 768 
pixels frame. Regarding hardware and software, the same equipment was used as in 
Study 1, however Psychopy v1.78 was used for creating the program that would display 
the images on the screen for reasons that were explained earlier. The three 
questionnaires were adopted and used as in Study 1 too. 
Procedure 
 Similarly with Study 1 all participants had to sign a consent form after their 
briefing and complete a demographics short questionnaire. Then the experimenter 
escorted the participants in an individual cubicle and provided them with general 
instructions. The experiment involved three tasks, with the first two being practice tasks 
and the third one the main test task. For the first practice task an image (neutral) would 
appear on the screen for either “short”, 400ms, or “long”, 1600ms, duration. Once the 
image would disappear the participant would have to press either “S” for short or “L” 
for long. After the response an inter-trial interval varying randomly between 1 and 3 
seconds would follow. The sequence was predetermined to be S-L-S-L-S-L-S-L-S-L 
during the first practice.  
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For the second practice task again the same image would appear on the screen for either 
400ms or 1600ms. This time the sequence was random and feedback was displayed on 
the screen after each response for either “correct” or “incorrect” response. The feedback 
was displayed for 2 seconds followed by an inter-trial interval varying randomly 
between 1 and 3 seconds. This task would continue until the participant would give 
eight consecutive correct responses. The experimenter remained in the cubicle for both 
the first two tasks. Instructions for the third task were shown on the screen and once the 
participant would respond that instructions are clear and understood the experimenter 
would leave the cubicle.  
 For the main test task all six images (three neutral – three gambling) would be 
displayed on the screen for the seven durations of 400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, and 
1600ms in random order. That created 42 trials which were repeated three times, 
resulting in a final total of 126 trials. The participant was asked again to respond if the 
duration was perceived as “short” or “long” by pressing “S” or “L” respectively. 
Similarly with the practice tasks there was an inter-trial interval varying randomly 
between 1 and 3 seconds. However, there was no feedback after the participant 
responded.  
 Upon completion of the main task the experimenter would return to the cubicle 
to initiate the computerized form of the three questionnaires.  Once all three 
questionnaires were completed a message was displayed that the study was concluded. 
Other than the natural time gap occurring between the main task and the loading of the 
questionnaires there were no other breaks between steps. 
Results and Discussion 
Bisection Task 
 Data preparation. Following the methodology on analysing data for the 
bisection task (Tipples, 2008) prior to the data analysis d’ scores, bisection point (BP), 
and Weber ratio (WR) (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon, Church, and Meck, 1984) were 
calculated. Weber’s ratio corresponds to the smallest possible change that could a 
significant change in behaviour. In time perception it refers to the smallest possible 
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change in duration that will be noticeable. Lower WR scores refers to a high degree of 
discriminability, indicating that an individual can detect smaller changes (Kopec and 
Brody, 2010). First, we acquired the z scores for the ratio of long responses. We then 
calculated the differences d’, by subtracting the z score of the neutral images from the z 
score of the gambling images. Positive values of d’ would reflect an overestimation for 
the duration of the gambling stimuli compared to the neutral stimuli. 
 We then calculated the BP for each participant and each type of stimuli by using 
probit analysis, looking for the point where p(long) = .5 would be achieved, meaning 
0.5 ratio of long responses. Finally we calculated WR by subtracting p(long[.25]) from 
p(long[.75]) and then dividing that difference by 2, we then divided again by BP 
(Tipples, 2008). During this stage the probit analysis would not yield any results on two 
participants and despite out attempts to interpret why we did not come to a conclusion, 
therefore these two participants were excluded from the analysis. 
 Data analysis. One-way ANOVA analysis for the seven duration d’ scores did 
not reveal any significant effects (all F < 0.01, p > 0.9). For both the BP (t = -0.539, df = 
41, p > .593) and WR (t = -0.116, df = 41, p > .253) indices there were no significant 
differences between the gambling and neutral images. The means for BP and WR are 
presented in table 2.2.1 
Table 2.2.1 Means and standard deviations for BP and WR per image type 
Index    Image type M SD 
BP 
Gambling 1009.86 217.55 
Neutral 1021.5 190.36 
WR 
Gambling 177.15 67.88 
Neutral 194.02 69.56 
 
The above findings suggest that there was no effect of attention or arousal from the 
gambling images during the time bisection task. 
Correlational analysis with questionnaires. For both the BP and WR indices we 
calculated the differences between the gambling and neutral image type (dBR and 
dWR). We then ran correlational analysis to look for possible relations between the two 
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differences and the questionnaire results. There were no significant relations between 
the differences and the questionnaire results, findings are presented in table 2.2.2  
Table 2.2.2 Correlations for difference of BP, difference of WR, Craving, DSM, and PGSI 
 













.178 .112 .145 .169 -.021 -.136 -.077 
dWR   -.026 -.085 .035 -.029 .073 .019 






 -.248 -.215 
Anticipation     .387
**
 .291 -.293 -.213 
Desire      .796
**
 -.153 -.236 
Relief       -.193 -.092 
DSM        .786
**
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     
 
 
Study 2 synopsis. 
 In study 2 we hypothesised that if gambling stimuli were found as exciting or 
threatening that would have led to distorted time perception by either underestimating 
or overestimating time perception. However, our results did not reveal any distorted 
time perception which seems to be in line with study 1 where we did not observe any 
Stroop effect or increased willingness to gamble. These findings suggest that gambling 
related stimuli do not tend to lead to intrusive cognitions. The benefit of study 2 was 
that it allows us to establish a baseline removing any priming tasks. In order to draw 
safer conclusions regarding the role of priming, and compare with the results of study 1, 
we thought it would be useful to implement a more explicit priming task (in contrast to 
the more implicit priming task, Stroop, used in study 1). This could also allow us to 
draw conclusions and generalise about how time perception is affected when we are in a 
gambling environment (e.g. casino, or online poker game). 
Study 3 
 The results from Study 2 suggest that gambling stimuli are not salient enough to 
cause intrusive cognitions that could affect time perception. As a follow-up we decided 
to investigate if priming could result in distorted time perception. Priming in general 
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could be defined as an effect to subsequent responses as a result of exposure to specific 
stimuli (Thush et al., 2007). Priming can be accomplished with a variety of tasks that 
involve reading, watching stimuli, interacting with objects and usually individuals who 
are primed adopt a behaviour that is in line with the prime (Rodriguez, Neighbors, and 
Foster, 2014). This is probably due to activation of specific constructs that are 
associated with the priming cues and will later affect behaviour. 
 Priming has been used in addiction related research, for example alcohol related 
stimuli can prime individuals and activate alcohol related constructs resulting in 
speeding up responses to alcohol pictures (Duka and Townshend, 2004). The previous 
is a typical example of priming leading to attentional bias to alcohol related stimuli. 
Furthermore, a priming task can have the effect of placing an individual in specific 
mind-set that could even be unrelated to the priming stimuli (Hansen and Trope, 2013). 
We argue then that a priming task, with gambling related stimuli, could affect time 
perception, either directly by making gambling stimuli more salient thus leading to 
attentional biases, or indirectly by triggering a mind-set that can affect time perception 
as research has shown that mind-set can be a factor on how we perceive time (Kramer, 





 Seventy-two participants (age 18-46, mean age = 19.6, SD = 3.41, 60 females, 
12 males) were recruited via the Kent Psychology RPS website and were awarded 2 
RPS credits for their participation. 
Design 
The experiment was defined by five factors Duration (400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 
or 1600ms) x Image Type (gambling, neutral) x Prime Group (gambling, profession) x 
Session (first, second). Duration, Image Type, and Session were within-factors whereas 
Prime Group was between-subjects factor. 
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Materials 
 The images used for the time bisection task were the same as in Study 2 (refer to 
Study 2 for details on stimuli and software used). For the Prime Group task we collected 
19 words that could be associated with gambling or not (e.g., “raise”, “card”, “red”, for 
a list of all words see Appendix E). We selected the words using the images from Study 
1 as starting point the words selected represent characteristics that can be found in these 
images. 
Procedures 
 The experiment consisted of four separate stages. In the first stage participants 
had to perform the time bisection task exactly as described in the procedure section in 
Study 2. Once the bisection task was completed the experimenter would present an A4 
sheet containing the 19 words and instruct the participants to write next to each word 
either a gambling related word (gambling Prime Group) or profession that is related to 
the given word (profession Prime Group). There was time restriction; however 
participants were instructed to try not to repeat words, unless they genuinely could not 
find another word. Once they completed the priming task they had to run the time 
bisection task one more time. Finally, after completing the time bisection task for the 
second time they had to complete the three questionnaires (DSM-IV, PGSI, and GACS 
Results and discussion 
Bisection Task 
 Data preparation. Following the same methodology as in Study 2 we calculated 
d’ scores, bisection point (BP), and Weber ratio (WR) for the first and second Attempt 
(Tipples, 2008). 
 Data analysis. A three-way ANOVA was carried out on the z-scores, BP, and 
WR values. As described in the design section, Session and Duration were within-
subjects factors, whereas Prime Group was between-subjects factor. There was a main 
effect of priming on the z-scores with F(1, 70) = 4.480, p = .038. The means for z-scores 
were M = .075 (SE = 0.05) for the profession Prime Group, and M = -0.071 (SE = 0.05). 
No other main effects or interactions were significant (all F’s < 1.663, p’s > .129). 
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These results reveal an overestimation of time duration across all duration in the 
profession Prime Group compared to the gambling Prime Group.  
There was also a main effect of Session on the BP scores with F(1,70) = 2.849, p = 
.096. The BP mean values were, M = 986.35 (SE = 22.58) for the first Session and M = 
849.82 (SE = 81.55) for the second Session. No other main effects or interactions were 
significant (all F’s < 1.181, p’s > .25). These findings suggest that all participants 
perceived time to pass faster in the second session (as BP point was reached faster) 
compared to the first one.  
 Furthermore, there was a main effect of Session on WR scores with F (1, 70) = 
9.954, p = .002. The WR mean values were, M = 0.208 (SE = 0.014) for the first 
Session and M = .254 (SE = 0.024) for the second Session. The findings suggest that 
priming decreases participants’ discriminability.  
Questionnaires and correlational analysis. Two-way ANOVA’s were carried 
out to investigate possible main effects of Prime Group (profession, gambling) on each 
one of the questionnaires. There was a significant main effect of Prime Group on 
Anticipation with F (1, 70) = 6.482, p = .013. The mean anticipation score for the 
gambling Prime Group was M = 4.66 (SD = 1.68) and for the profession Prime Group 
M = 5.61 (SD = 1.48). There was also a significant main effect of Prime Group on DSM 
with F (1, 70) = 3.383, p = .070. The mean DSM score for the gambling Prime Group 
was M = 0.81 (SD = 0.12) and for the profession Prime Group M = 0.37 (SD = 0.07). 
Furthermore, we calculated the differences for BP and WR per session and image type 
and ran correlational analyses between these scores. The results are summarised in 
Tables 3.1 to 3.4 
 
Table 3.1: Pearson Correlations for gambling Prime Group between WR scores and questionnaires. D_WRG and 
D_WRN correspond to the differences between WR scores for gambling and neutral stimuli. 
 
  D_WRN Craving Anticipation Desire Relief DSM PGSI 
D_WRG  -.196 .089 .135 -.020 .077 -.241 -.087 
D_WRN   -.015 .052 .166 -.343
*
 .295 -.062 






















Table 3.3: Pearson Correlations for gambling Prime Group between BP scores and questionnaires. D_BPG and 
D_BPN correspond to the differences between BP scores for gambling and neutral stimuli 
 




Relief DSM PGSI 
D_BPG  -.300 -.153 -.165 -.069 -.145 .095 .078 
D_BPN   .083 .144 .124 -.127 .437
**
 -.031 
















Desire      .634
**
 -.132 -.057 
Relief       -.161 .099 
DSM        .553
**
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Desire      .634
**
 -.132 -.057 
Relief       -.161 .099 
DSM        .553
**
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 3.2: Pearson Correlations for profession Prime Group between WR scores and questionnaires D_WRG and 
D_WRN correspond to the differences between WR scores for gambling and neutral stimuli. 
   
  D_WRN Craving Anticipation Desire Relief DSM PGSI 
D_WRG  .035 .108 -.036 .075 .311 .069 -.032 






 -.111 -.063 






 -.091 -.279 









Desire      .817
**
 .117 -.101 
Relief       .238 .039 
DSM        .501
**
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 3.4: Pearson Correlations for profession Prime Group between BP scores and questionnaires D_BPG and 
D_BPN correspond to the differences between BP scores for gambling and neutral stimuli 
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Study 3 synopsis. 
 In study 3 we wanted to investigate whether a gambling related state of mind 
would affect time perception. We found that there was a main effect across both 
priming conditions which could probably mean that discovered a practice effect that is 
more related to the repetition of the time perception task itself than the priming task. 
Results also suggest that time discriminability was reduced, but again this was across 
both groups, which suggests that it could be a practice effect. Finally, the analysis of    
z-scores suggests that participants underestimated time duration when in the gambling 
condition compared to when in the profession condition. This could be an interesting 
finding as it suggests that we do have distorted time perception when primed for 
gambling, however this was not supported by our BP’s and WR’s analysis and it needs 




 The present research investigated whether gambling related stimuli could lead to 
intrusive cognitions. More particularly we looked for possible interference due to 
gambling stimuli either on the task at hand or for interference that was carried over to 
following tasks. In Study 1 we used a gambling modified Stroop task that served both as 
measurement of direct gambling intrusive cognitions and as a priming gambling 
mechanism for following up tasks. There were no findings that could indicate the 
presence of either a fast or slow effect suggesting that the gambling stimuli were not 
  D_BPN Craving Anticipation Desire Relief DSM PGSI 
D_BPG  .563
**
 .269 .332 .146 .148 -.104 -.158 
D_BPN   .213 .266 .021 .210 -.178 -.205 






 -.091 -.279 









Desire      .817
**
 .117 -.101 
Relief       .238 .039 
DSM        .501
**
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
GAMBLING STIMULI AND INTRUSIVE COGNITIONS  40 
 
salient enough for such an effect as literature suggests regarding addiction or emotional 
Stroop (e.g. Blanchete and Richards, 2013). There was however a significant correlation 
with Craving and Anticipation. This was a rather interesting finding as it suggests that 
gambling stimuli could have a slower carried over effect and even though they did not 
interfere with the Stroop test they managed to increase Craving and Anticipation to 
gamble.  
This could be in line with the EI theory that suggests that in the presence of cues 
a loop is initiated that could lead to desire thoughts for gambling. This finding is further 
reinforced by some of the results from the time production task in Study 1. Even though 
there were no significant effects of gambling stimuli on the duration of the intervals that 
were produced there was a significant correlation between first and second attempt for 
participants who belong to the gambling Prime Group. For the neutral Prime Group no 
such significant correlation was found. This could suggest that in the neutral Prime 
Group the two attempts were not correlated because participants improved and were 
more accurate in the second attempt. The same could not be said for the gambling Prime 
Group revealing perhaps an interference that prevented them from improving, possibly 
due to cognitive resources being used by the desire thoughts that we mentioned above.  
We also argued that a possible effect of these intrusive cognitions would be to 
make participants gamble more, or take bigger risks. Such an effect was not observed 
overall, as we mainly saw the amount of money as a decisive factor. However, there 
was a significant difference between gambling and neutral Prime Group when the 
amount of money was £40. This could suggest that the specific amount of money could 
perhaps be a sensitivity boundary that participants were more willing to gamble. It 
would be interesting in further replications of Study 1 to focus on sums that are closer to 
£40 and see how people will behave. 
Finally the GACS questionnaire revealed a significant difference in Desire 
scores between the gambling and neutral Prime Group. Again this could be another 
indication that gambling stimuli presented in the Stroop test, although they did not 
produce any Stroop effects, could possibly produce an effect that was slower to develop 
and was materialised in subsequent tasks as the EI theory proposes. The above provide 
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substantial reasons for examining more the effects on gambling Stroop on subsequent 
tasks in future studies. 
In Study 2 we wanted to investigate whether gambling stimuli could affect time 
perception without the presence of previous priming mechanisms (like the gambling 
Stroop task used in Study 1). We based our hypothesis mainly on previous research that 
showed that threatening stimuli can affect the pacemaker and exciting stimuli can affect 
the mode switch (e.g. Droit-Volet, 2004). For this reason we used a time bisection task 
and not a time production task, since the first has the ability to better discriminate 
between arousal and attention effects on time perception. 
However, we did not find any evidence that gambling stimuli can affect time 
perception in a time bisection task. Similarly to Study 1 gambling stimuli were not 
salient enough to lead to immediate intrusive cognitions. In addition, we did not observe 
any significant correlations between BP, WR Craving, DSM, and PGSI questionnaires. 
This could suggest that the task itself could not initiate intrusive cognitions that could 
lead to desire thought as proposed in the EI theory. One explanation could be that in the 
gambling Stroop participants in the gambling Prime Group would see a total of 96 
gambling related stimuli whereas in the time bisection task there were only 63 
presentations of gambling stimuli (if we take into consideration all durations). So 
perhaps the number of stimuli or the total exposure time to gambling stimuli were not 
enough either to initiate desire thoughts or maintain them. Another explanation could be 
that in gambling Stroop task participants were instructed to respond as fast and as 
accurately as possible, which could have resulted in them being more focused and 
allocated more attentional resources on the task. 
Having established that gambling stimuli could not have an immediate effect on 
time perception we wanted to investigate whether priming would facilitate intrusive 
cognitions. Our hypothesis was based on research suggesting that priming can have an 
effect on attentional bias in both problem and social drinkers (Clarke, Sharma, and 
Salter, 2014) and self-reported drinking can prime participants and affect their 
responses (Rodriguez, Neighbors, and Foster, 2014). Furthermore, the mind-set that we 
are in could have an effect on time perception (e.g. Hansen, and Trope, 2013; Kramer, 
Weger, and Sharma, 2013). 
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Firstly, we observed an overall shift to the right for the z-scores for the gambling 
Prime Group compared to the profession Prime Group. The fact that there was no 
interaction with the Image Type indicated that participants that were in the gambling 
Prime Group underestimated time compared to participants in the profession Prime 
Group. Furthermore, session affected both the overall BP and WR scores. BP was lower 
in the second session indicating that the priming task made participants overestimate 
durations. The fact that there was no interaction with the type of priming suggests that 
these changes are not due to making gambling stimuli more salient but more due to 
creating a specific mind-set that was common in both Prime Groups.  
This is reinforced even more by the fact that there was also a main effect of 
session on WR. This time WR increased from first to second session, making 
participants less able to detect smaller changes in durations. Again there was no 
interaction present with the Prime Group. So we have the image of participants 
overestimating time and at the same time reducing their discriminability. As mentioned 
above, these findings are more in line with the mind-set explanation than with 
perceiving gambling stimuli as threatening or exciting. Overestimating time means 
people are rather in an abstract mind-set than a concrete one which suggests that our 
priming tasks probably created an abstract mind-set rather than increasing the salient of 
gambling stimuli. 
However, this is not a clear implication as our priming task was not designed for 
creating an abstract or concrete mind-set. It is therefore vital to replicate Study 3 making 
the priming task even more specific and control for abstract and concrete mind-set. A 
different explanation for this universal change in time perception (regardless of specific 
Prime Group) could be that the original words could still create gambling cues even 
though participants had to think of professions since they are related to gambling. 
Therefore, another alternative for future research could be to select a different priming 
task that can clearly distinguish between gambling priming and non-gambling priming. 
Another dimension that is worth investigating in the future is that of the emotion in 
gambling where we could present positive or negative gambling stimuli. That way we 
could compare the results directly with findings from the study of the effect of emotion 
in time perception. 
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A possible limitation for this research could be the fact that there no validated 
gambling stimuli that could be used, which could imply that the findings depend on 
selected stimuli. The items used in the three studies though were items that are 
commonly associated with gambling (see also conclusion section regarding stimuli 
limitations). Furthermore, our participants were mostly 18 and 19 years old possibly 
with not many gambling experiences (either positive or negative). Therefore, it would 
be ideal to replicate the studies with older participants or include questionnaires that 
measure participation in gambling and attitudes towards gambling. 
Conclusion. 
 The main aim of this research was to establish whether gambling stimuli can 
lead to intrusive cognitions which can result in distorted time perception and increased 
craving for gambling. Despite the use of different time perception and priming tasks we 
did not find evidence that gambling stimuli can cause such intrusive cognitions. One 
possible limitation of our methodology was that we used pictorial stimuli which 
someone could argue that they are ecologically more valid than words when it comes to 
gambling.  
 Given the fact that no prior work was done on time perception and gambling, to 
the knowledge of the author, there was no valid collection of pictorial stimuli that we 
could have used for our studies. This led us to create our own stimuli. Even though we 
tried to match the gambling related stimuli with neutral stimuli with regards to 
geometrical and colour features in every image one could still argue that these images 
could be unmatched in other aspects (e.g. emotional impact or arousal). Therefore, 
future studies could try to replicate the methodology used but with words instead of 
images.  
 The above mentioned lack of conclusive evidence, the possible limitations with 
the use of pictorial stimuli over words and the lack of prior work on the use of time 
bisection task with gambling stimuli suggest that the findings of this research thesis 
should be view as informative and not conclusive. Future research is needed to address 
the above mentioned issues before we can draw safer conclusions on whether gambling 
stimuli can cause intrusive cognitions to non-gamblers. 
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Appendix A 
DSM-IV gambling questionnaire 
In the last 12 months… 
When you gamble, how often do you go back another day to win back money you lost? 
Every time I lost Most of the time I lost  Some of the time I lost Never 
How often have you found yourself thinking about gambling  
Very often  Fairly often  Occasionally   Never 
Have you needed to gamble with more and more money to get the excitement you are looking for? 
Very often  Fairly often  Occasionally   Never 
Have you felt restless or irritable when trying to cut down gambling? 
Very often  Fairly often  Occasionally   Never 
Have you gambled to escape from problems or when you are feeling depressed, anxious or bad about 
yourself? 
Very often  Fairly often  Occasionally   Never 
Have you lied to family, or others, to hide the extent of your gambling? 
Very often  Fairly often  Occasionally   Never 
Have you made unsuccessful attempts to control, cut back or stop gambling? 
Very often  Fairly often  Occasionally   Never 
Have you committed a crime in order to finance gambling or to pay gambling debts? 
Very often  Fairly often  Occasionally   Never 
Have you risked or lost an important relationship, job, educational or work opportunity because of 
gambling? 
Very often  Fairly often  Occasionally   Never 
Have you asked others to provide money to help with a desperate financial situation caused by gambling? 
Very often  Fairly often  Occasionally   Never 




In the last 12 months how often… 
Have you bet more than you could really afford to lose? 
Almost always  Most of the time  Some of the time  Never 
Have you needed to gamble with larger amounts of money to get the same excitement? 
Almost always  Most of the time  Some of the time  Never 
Have you gone back to try to win back the money you’d lost? 
Almost always  Most of the time  Some of the time  Never 
Have you borrowed money or sold anything to get money to gamble? 
Almost always  Most of the time  Some of the time  Never 
Have you felt that you might have a problem with gambling? 
Almost always  Most of the time  Some of the time  Never 
Have you felt that gambling has caused you any health problems, including stress or anxiety? 
Almost always  Most of the time  Some of the time  Never 
Have people critised your betting, or told you that you have a gambling problem, whether or not you 
thought it is true? 
Almost always  Most of the time  Some of the time  Never 
Have you felt your gambling has caused financial problems for you or your household? 
Almost always  Most of the time  Some of the time  Never 
Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or what happens when you gamble? 
Almost always  Most of the time  Some of the time  Never 
  




Gambling would be more fun right now 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree  3. Agree somewhat  4. Undecided   
5. Disagree somewhat  6. Disagree  7. Strongly Disagree 
If I had an opportunity to gamble right now, I probably would take it 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree  3. Agree somewhat  4. Undecided   
5. Disagree somewhat  6. Disagree  7. Strongly Disagree 
I would not enjoy gambling right now 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree  3. Agree somewhat  4. Undecided   
5. Disagree somewhat  6. Disagree  7. Strongly Disagree 
I crave gambling right now 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree  3. Agree somewhat  4. Undecided   
5. Disagree somewhat  6. Disagree  7. Strongly Disagree 
I need to gamble right now 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree  3. Agree somewhat  4. Undecided   
5. Disagree somewhat  6. Disagree  7. Strongly Disagree 
I have an urge to gamble 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree  3. Agree somewhat  4. Undecided   
5. Disagree somewhat  6. Disagree  7. Strongly Disagree 
If I were gambling right now, I could think more clearly 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree  3. Agree somewhat  4. Undecided   
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5. Disagree somewhat  6. Disagree  7. Strongly Disagree 
I could control things better right now if I could gamble 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree  3. Agree somewhat  4. Undecided   
5. Disagree somewhat  6. Disagree  7. Strongly Disagree 
Gambling would make me less depressed 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree  3. Agree somewhat  4. Undecided   
5. Disagree somewhat  6. Disagree  7. Strongly Disagree 
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Appendix D 
Scenario 1 (note that each participant would be randomly presented with one of the five 
different variations) 
 
Imagine you have £250, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. No bet. Keep the £250 
2. Bet at 50% chance of winning £500 
3. Bet at 25% chance of winning £1,000 
4. Bet at 10% chance of winning £2,500 
5. Bet at 1% chance of winning £25,000 
Imagine you have £250, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 1% chance of winning £25,000 
2. No bet. Keep the £250 
3. Bet at 50% chance of winning £500 
4. Bet at 25% chance of winning £1,000 
5. Bet at 10% chance of winning £2,500 
Imagine you have £250, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 10% chance of winning £2,500 
2. Bet at 1% chance of winning £25,000 
3. No bet. Keep the £250 
4. Bet at 50% chance of winning £500 
5. Bet at 25% chance of winning £1,000 
Imagine you have £250, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 25% chance of winning £1,000 
2. Bet at 10% chance of winning £2,500 
3. Bet at 1% chance of winning £25,000 
4. No bet. Keep the £250 
5. Bet at 50% chance of winning £500 
Imagine you have £250, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 50% chance of winning £500 
2. Bet at 25% chance of winning £1,000 
3. Bet at 10% chance of winning £2,500 
4. Bet at 1% chance of winning £25,000 
5. No bet. Keep the £250 
 




Scenario 2 (note that each participant would be randomly presented with one of the five 
different variations) 
 
Imagine you have £40, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. No bet. Keep the £40 
2. Bet at 50% chance of winning £80 
3. Bet at 25% chance of winning £160 
4. Bet at 10% chance of winning £400 
5. Bet at 1% chance of winning £4,000 
Imagine you have £40, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 1% chance of winning £4,000 
2. No bet. Keep the £40 
3. Bet at 50% chance of winning £80 
4. Bet at 25% chance of winning £160 
5. Bet at 10% chance of winning £400 
Imagine you have £40, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 10% chance of winning £400 
2. Bet at 1% chance of winning £4,000 
3. No bet. Keep the £40 
4. Bet at 50% chance of winning £80 
5. Bet at 25% chance of winning £160 
Imagine you have £40, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 25% chance of winning £160 
2. Bet at 10% chance of winning £400 
3. Bet at 1% chance of winning £4,000 
4. No bet. Keep the £40 
5. Bet at 50% chance of winning £80 
Imagine you have £40, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 50% chance of winning £80 
2. Bet at 25% chance of winning £160 
3. Bet at 10% chance of winning £400 
4. Bet at 1% chance of winning £4,000 
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5. No bet. Keep the £40 
 
 
Scenario 2 (note that each participant would be randomly presented with one of the five 
different variations) 
 
Imagine you have £25, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. No bet. Keep the £25 
2. Bet at 50% chance of winning £50 
3. Bet at 25% chance of winning £100 
4. Bet at 10% chance of winning £250 
5. Bet at 1% chance of winning £2,500 
Imagine you have £25, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 1% chance of winning £2,500 
2. No bet. Keep the £25 
3. Bet at 50% chance of winning £50 
4. Bet at 25% chance of winning £100 
5. Bet at 10% chance of winning £250 
Imagine you have £25, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 10% chance of winning £250 
2. Bet at 1% chance of winning £2,500 
3. No bet. Keep the £25 
4. Bet at 50% chance of winning £50 
5. Bet at 25% chance of winning £100 
Imagine you have £25, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 25% chance of winning £100 
2. Bet at 10% chance of winning £250 
3. Bet at 1% chance of winning £2,500 
4. No bet. Keep the £25 
5. Bet at 50% chance of winning £50 
Imagine you have £25, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 50% chance of winning £50 
2. Bet at 25% chance of winning £100 
3. Bet at 10% chance of winning £250 
4. Bet at 1% chance of winning £2,500 
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Scenario 2 (note that each participant would be randomly presented with one of the five 
different variations) 
 
Imagine you have £2, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. No bet. Keep the £2 
2. Bet at 50% chance of winning £4 
3. Bet at 25% chance of winning £8 
4. Bet at 10% chance of winning £20 
5. Bet at 1% chance of winning £200 
Imagine you have £2, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 1% chance of winning £200 
2. No bet. Keep the £2 
3. Bet at 50% chance of winning £4 
4. Bet at 25% chance of winning £8 
5. Bet at 10% chance of winning £20 
Imagine you have £2, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 10% chance of winning £20 
2. Bet at 1% chance of winning £200 
3. No bet. Keep the £2 
4. Bet at 50% chance of winning £4 
5. Bet at 25% chance of winning £8 
Imagine you have £2, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 25% chance of winning £8 
2. Bet at 10% chance of winning £20 
3. Bet at 1% chance of winning £200 
4. No bet. Keep the £2 
5. Bet at 50% chance of winning £4 
Imagine you have £2, which bet would you be willing to make? 
1. Bet at 50% chance of winning £4 
2. Bet at 25% chance of winning £8 
3. Bet at 10% chance of winning £20 
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4. Bet at 1% chance of winning £200 
5. No bet. Keep the £2 
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Appendix E 
List of the 19 words used for the priming task in Study 3 and sample of replies 
depending on the Prime Group 
 Gambling Prime Group Profession Prime Group 
Raise Auction engineer 
Chair Dealer mechanic 
Table Blackjack teacher 
Money Gamble CEO 
Chips Poker manager 
Coins Slot machine banker 
Lose Broke lawyer 
Card Suit accountant 
Risk Loss surgeon 
Twenty-one Win physician 
Straight M doctor 
Black Spades Police officer 
Red Diamonds chemist 
Spin Black ballerina 
Zero Green doctpr 
Ball White athlete 
Numbers Counting cards mathematician 
Pot Play chef 








        
 
 
